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Abstract 
 
Education as a tool in the fight against corruption has been subject to much debate in academic 
and policy making circles. This note extends what we know on this nexus in a threefold manner: 
namely, in terms of: incremental, lifelong learning and synergy effects. Four main findings are 
established. First, education is a powerful tool in the fight against corruption. Second, there is 
evidence of an incremental effect in the transition from secondary to tertiary education.  Third, 
lifelong learning defined as knowledge acquired during primary, secondary and tertiary education 
negatively affects corruption. Fourth, there is evidence of a ‘synergy effect’ because the impact 
of lifelong learning is higher than the combined effects of various educational levels. The 
empirical evidence is based on 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010. Two main policy 
implications are derived. First, encouraging education through the tertiary level enhances the 
fight against corruption. Second, the drive towards a knowledge economy by means of lifelong 
learning has ‘corruption mitigating’ benefits.  
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1. Introduction 
 The debate over the effect of education on corruption has been mixed, at best, in the 
theoretical and empirical literature. On the one hand, a first strand of studies support the role of 
education in negatively affecting corruption via, inter alia, channels of legal behavior, social 
responsibility and, improved social cohesion (Heyneman, 2002, 2008a; Beets, 2005; Oreopoulos 
and Salvanes, 2009). A position that is supported by cross-country studies (Lederman et al., 
2005; Cheung and Chan, 2008). On the other hand, a second stream of studies suggests that 
education increases participation in corrupt activities (Kaffenberger, 2012; Mocan, 2008; Truex, 
2011). Kaffenberger (2012) has recently confirmed the positive nexus between education and 
corruption postulated and empirically validated by Mocan (2008). This is broadly consistent with 
Truex (2011) who earlier established that education is a primary determinant of the corruption. 
On a general note, exploratory studies (Hyneman, 2004, 2008b) are consistent on the subject of 
the high economic cost of corruption (Heyneman et al., 2007).  
 Corruption and knowledge economy (KE) are two roots of African development because, 
while the former is the third most important development concern (after poverty and 
unemployment), the knowledge index of the continent is substantially lower than the rest of the 
world (Anyanwu, 2009). Given the key role of KE in twenty first century development, 
investigating the incidence of lifelong learning on corruption in the continent has substantial 
policy relevance. However, as far as we are aware,  the KE-corruption nexus remains a missing 
strand in the corruption literature
1
.  
 In light of the above, this Note contributes to the existing literature by introducing the 
notion of lifelong learning in this education-corruption nexus. After exploring a plethora of 
studies in the education and lifelong learning literature, Tuijnman (2003) concluded that an all-
                                                 
1
 The growing stream of KE-related studies has focused on, inter alia, broad views on KE (Aubert, 2005; Rooney, 
2005; Lin, 2006; Anyanwu, 2012; Makinda, 2007); indigenous knowledge systems (Raseroka, 2008; Lwoga et al., 
2010);  information and communication technologies (Maurer, 2008; Jonathan and Camilo, 2008; Ondiege, 2010; 
Chavula, 2010; Aker and Mbiti, 2010; Merritt, 2010; Butcher, 2011; Demonbynes and Thegeya, 2012; Thacker and 
Wright, 2012; Penard et al., 2012;  Asongu, 2014a, 2013a); education (Kamara et al., 2007; Ford, 2007; Weber, 
2011; Wantchekon et al., 2014; Amavilah, 2009); innovation (Carisle et al., 2013; Oyelaran-Oyeyinka and Sampath, 
2007); economic incentives and institutional regime (Cogburn, 2003; Nguena and Tsafack, 2014; Andrés and 
Asongu, 2013a; Saxegaard, 2006; Letiche, 2006); intellectual capital and economic development (Preece, 2013; 
Wagiciengo and Belal, 2012); research and development (Sumberg, 2005; German and Stroud, 2007); intellectual 
property rights (Zerbe, 2005; Lor and Britz, 2005; Myburgh, 2011; Asongu, 2013b, 2014b; Andrés and Asongu, 
2013ab; Andrés et al., 2014); KE in space transformation (Moodley, 2003; Maswera et al., 2008);  spatiality in the 
production of  knowledge (Bidwell et al., 2011; Neimark, 2012); KE related to financial development (Asongu, 
2013c, 2014cd) and KE catch-up  with respect of the East Asian miracle (Kim et al., 2012; Lucas, 1988, 1993; 
Andrés et al., 2014; Bezmen and Depken, 2004; Andrés and Asongu, 2013ab; Asongu, 2014e, 2015, 2013de). 
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inclusive indicator for lifelong learning could only be comprehensively derived in the distant 
future: “But given the current state of play of the social sciences, and in particular of survey 
practice and indicator measurement, the time when a holistic and comprehensive framework of 
lifelong learning indicators can be proposed lies far in the future” (p.471). Moreover, “To date 
only two macro level studies, i.e. the European Lifelong Learning Indicators (ELLI) instrument 
developed by the EU (2010) and the Composite Learning Index (CLI) instrument developed by 
the Canadian Council on Learning (undated.), have dealt with this issue” (Luo, 2015, p.19). 
Whereas the ELLI exclusively applies to European countries, the CLI is Canada’s measure of 
advancement in lifelong learning. These two indicators entail dimensions of ‘learning to know’, 
‘learning to do’, ‘learning to live together’ and ‘learning to be’. However, there are at least two 
shortcomings in the application of these indicators to African countries: (i) they are exclusively 
for European countries and Canada and (ii) as far as we know, only data on the ‘learning to 
know’ dimension is available for African countries.  Lifelong learning is defined in this study as 
the combined knowledge acquired during primary, secondary and tertiary education levels. 
Moreover, by assessing the independent effects of the educational levels on corruption, we also 
investigate if there is an incremental impact of education on corruption. The Note also extends a 
growing stream of literature on using learning activities (Nyarko, 2013a) or existing lessons and 
success strategies in achieving development (Babatunde, 2012; Lee and  Kim, 2009; Wa Gĩthĩnji 
and Adesida, 2011; Lee, 2009; Fosu, 2013a)
2
. The remainder of the Note is organized in the 
following manner. Data and methodology are discussed in Section 2, empirical results are 
covered in Section 3 and Section 4 provides concluding remarks.    
 
  
2. Data and Methodology 
2. 1 Data 
 We examine a panel of 53 African countries using annual data from World Bank 
Development Indicators for the period 1996-2010. The period of study begins from 1996 because 
                                                 
2
 From past lessons (Fosu, 2010), Fosu (2012, 2013a) has recently documented  interesting literature on  lessons and 
strategies for  achieving development success. The plethora of lessons are drawn from: the emerging Asian giants of 
China and India (Singh, 2013; Yao, 2013; Santos-Paulino, 2013); East Asia and the Pacific (Lee, 2013; Jomo and 
Wee, 2013; Warr, 2013; Thoburn, 2013; Khan, 2013); Latin America and the Caribbean  (De Mello, 2013; Solimano, 
2013; Trejos, 2013; Pozo et al., 2013; Cardoso, 2013);  the Middle East and North Africa (Looney, 2013; 
Baliamoune-Lutz, 2013; Nyarko, 2013b;  Drine, 2013) and; sub-Saharan Africa (Robinson, 2013; Subramanian, 
2013; Lundahl and Petersson, 2013; Fosu, 2013b; Naudé, 2013). 
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the corruption dependent variables are only available as from this date. The choice of Africa as 
the scope of study is consistent with the continent’s relatively higher levels of corruption and 
declining knowledge index (Anyanwu, 2009). In accordance with recent corruption literature 
(Asongu, 2012a), the dependent variables are the corruption perception and corruption control 
indices. As shown in Table 1, the corruption perception index (CPI) is an aggregation of 
perceived corruption levels as determined by opinion surveys and expert investigations, while, 
the corruption control index (CC) captures perceptions of the extent to which public power can be 
used for private rewards, including both grand and petty types of corruption as well as capture of 
the state by private interests and elites. The CPI is disclosed in decreasing order such that 
countries with higher values enjoy lower levels of corruption, whereas CC is disclosed in 
increasing order with higher values representing countries with higher levels of corruption-
control. Hence, in the interpretation of estimated coefficients, a positive sign from estimated 
parameters on the CPI (CC) is considered as evidence of decreasing (increasing) corruption 
(corruption-control). From low to high values, the CPI ranges from 0 to 10 whereas the CC 
ranges from -2.5 to 2.5
3
. The independent variable of interest is measured as the first principal 
component of primary, secondary and tertiary education. This principal exogenous indicator is 
complemented with its constituent variables in order to assess incremental evidence in the 
education-corruption nexus. Moreover, in order to fully appreciate a synergy effect, independent 
effects of the constituent indicators are needed. The principal component analysis (PCA) 
employed to calibrate the lifelong learning indicator is presented below.  
 In line with the corruption literature, we control for economic prosperity (in terms of GDP 
growth), trade openness and inflation. Economic growth could increase corruption (Asongu and 
Jellal, 2013, p. 2196; Asongu, 2013f, p. 63) and mitigate the control of corruption (Asongu, 
2013g, p. 44). This assertion also holds for per capita economic prosperity (Asongu, 2013h, p. 
16). Based on intuition, stable and low inflation are conducive for the control of corruption due to 
economic certainty since high inflation rates (owing to rapidly rising foods prices) could compel 
citizens to resort to more corrupt means of making ends meet. Trade openness broadly decreases 
                                                 
3
 We compare two countries to further articulate measurement and interpretation insights, namely: Cameroon which 
has twice been ranked as the most corrupt country in the world and Botswana which is usually considered as one of 
the least corrupt countries in Africa. In 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010, the average CPI (CC) of Botswana is 
respectively 6.1, 6.03, 6.03, 5,63 and 5.73 (0.61, 0.73, 0.88, 0.97 and 0.93) whereas the corresponding values for 
Cameroon respectively are 1.40, 1.83, 2.03, 2.30 and 2.23 (-1.13, -1.09, -1.01, -1.05 and -0.93). Hence, while higher 
CPI values for Botswana do not represent higher corruption levels, her higher CC values denote higher corruption-
control levels. 
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this scourge on society (Asongu, 2012a) because globalization has been documented as a strong 
tool in the fight against corruption (Lalountas et al., 2011; Asongu, 2014f). 
 Variable definitions, summary statistics and the correlation analysis are presented in 
Appendix 1, Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 respectively. The descriptive statistics inform us that 
the variables are comparable. Thus,  based on the extent of variations we can be confident that 
some reasonable estimated relationships will emerge. The correlation analysis provides some 
feelings on the expected signs.  
 
 
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
 There is currently no consensus on  how lifelong learning should be measured because it 
is a multidimensional and complex phenomenon (Kirby et al., 2010). This is principally because 
it entails the process of learning from birth to death. Within the framework of this Note, lifelong 
learning is defined as the process of formal education that encompasses primary, secondary and 
tertiary school levels. Therefore, the phenomenon is calibrated as the combined knowledge 
acquired during the course of these three levels of education.  
 Consistent with the above intuition and narrative, we employ PCA analysis to appreciate 
the combined knowledge acquired. The PCA technique is a common statistical method used to 
reduce a higher set of correlated variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated indicators that 
represent a significant proportion of variability or information in the constituent or combined 
indicators. The Jolliffe (2002) and Kaiser (1974) criteria are employed to select the principal 
indicator. It requires the retention of principal components that have an eigenvalue higher than 
the mean or one. In this light, as presented in Table 1 below, the first principal component (PC) 
accounts for over 65% of the combined information and has an eigenvalue of 1.955. The index 
we create through PCA is called Educatex, which is the indicator of lifelong learning. This 
indicator has been recently employed by Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016) in assessing the role of 
lifelong learning in political stability and non-violence.   
 As we highlighted in the introduction, Educatex is different from the two existing 
macroeconomic indicators of lifelong learning in at least two respects.  It focuses on (i) a set of 
developing countries and (ii) the ‘learning to know’ dimension of the ELLI and CLI for European 
countries and Canada respectively.  
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Table 1: Principal Component Analysis for an educational index (Educatex)  
       
 Component Loadings  Cumulative   
     
 PSE SSE TSE Proportion  Proportion  Eigen value  
First PC 0.443 0.659 0.607 0.651 0.651 1.955 
Second PC 0.868 -0.147 -0.474 0.267 0.918 0.801 
Third PC  -0.223 0.737 -0.638 0.081 1.000 0.243 
       
PC: Principal Component. PSE: Primary School Enrolment. SSE: Secondary School Enrolment. TSE: Tertiary 
School Enrolment.  
 
 We devote space to briefly discussing the statistical relevance of the PC-derived lifelong 
learning indicator. Consistent with Asongu and Nwachukwu (2015, 2016), we engage this at two 
levels: general and specific points. At the general level, Pagan (1984, p. 242) documented an 
interesting analysis on issues arising from regressors that are derived from initial estimations. The 
concerns raised are allied to the consistency, efficiency and validity of corresponding estimated 
parameters. According to the narrative, while two-step estimators are reliable for the most part, 
they provide few valid inferences. This concern has been confirmed in more contemporary 
studies, namely:  Oxley and McAleer (1993), Ba and Ng (2006), McKenzie and McAleer (1997), 
and Westerlund and Urbain (2013a).  
 With regard to the specific point, we are employing a PC indicator.  Concerns about PC 
variables have been substantially documented by Westerlund and Urbain (2012, 2013b) who have 
built on previous studies (cited in the preceding paragraph) and other related literature (Stock and 
Watson, 2002; Pesaran, 2006; Bai, 2009; Bai, 2003; Greenaway-McGrevy et al., 2012). The 
authors advised that normal corollaries can be made with PC-factor augmented estimations if 
corresponding estimated coefficients converge towards their true values at the rate of 
NT (where N represents cross-section observations and T denotes the number of time series). 
Moreover, Westerlund and Urbain (2012, 2013b) have argued that conditions for convergence 
(needed for good inferences of estimated parameters from PC-derived factors) are more 
appropriate for a relatively large sample. But there is no mention of how large should be large. 
With regards to our sample, we can neither increase T nor N for two main reasons. First, we are 
unable to increase N, because 53 of the 54 African countries have been engaged, with the 
exception of South Sudan for which data is not available before 2011. Second, we cannot stretch 
the starting year (of 1996) further back because corruption indicators of the World Bank are only 
available from 1996.  
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2.2.2 Estimation technique 
An endogeneity-consistent system Generalized Methods of Methods (GMM) is adopted as our 
empirical strategy for four main reasons. First, the methodology is appropriate when the 
dependent variables are persistent. The correlation between the CPI and its lagged values is 0.945 
while that between CC and its lagged values is 0.930. For the system GMM technique, as far as 
we know, a rule of thumb threshold for evidence of persistence in the dependent variable is 
0.800. Second it controls for endogeneity in all the regressors. Third, cross-country regressions 
are not eliminated with the procedure. Fourth it reduces biases of the difference estimators 
resulting from small samples. It is substantially for the third reason that we have been consistent 
with Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4) in choosing   the system GMM estimation (Arellano and Bover, 
1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) instead of the difference approach (Arellano and Bond, 1991). In 
the specification, the two-step procedure is adopted because it is heteroscedasiticty consistent. In 
order to investigate the validity of the estimations, two tests are preformed, notably: the Sargan 
overidentifying restrictions (OIR) test for instrument validity and the Arellano and Bond 
autocorrelation (AR[2]) test for the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals. We control for 
time-fixed effects to further control for the unobserved heterogeneity. Short-run or business cycle 
disturbances are mitigated with the use of three-year non-overlapping intervals (NOI). Moreover, 
by employing data averages, we consolidate the primary condition for the use of the GMM 
technique: N>T (53>5). Moreover, we have consistently ensured that the instruments are less 
than the number of cross-sections to mitigate instrument proliferation concerns.  
 In light of the above, the GMM equations in level and first difference are as follows:  
titi
j
tijtitititititi XEducatexTSESSEPSECC ,
3
1
,,5,4,3,21,10,   

     (1)       
 
)()()()( 1,,41,,31,,22,1,11,,   titititititititititi TSETSESSESSEPSEPSECCCC   
  )()()( 1,,1
3
1
1,,1,,5 

   tititt
j
titijtiti XXEducatexEducatex                             (2) 
 Where: ‘t’ represents the period and ‘i’ stands for a country. C  is either the CPI or CC; 
PSE, Primary School Enrolment; SSE , Secondary School Enrolment; TSE , Tertiary School 
Enrolment; Educatex, lifelong learning; X is the set of control variables (GDP growth, trade 
openness and inflation); i is a country-specific effect;  t  is a time-specific constant and  ti ,  is 
an error term. The estimation procedure consists of simultaneously estimating the regression in 
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levels (Eq. [1]) with that in first-difference (Eq. [2]), thereby exploiting all the orthogonality or 
parallel conditions between the error term and lagged endogenous variable.  
 
 
3. Empirical results  
 The results presented in this section address four main concerns: the incidence of 
education on corruption; the incremental role of educational levels on the corruption; the role of 
lifelong learning and a synergy effect. The findings are presented in Tables 2-3 below. Based on 
the information criteria for the validity of models highlighted above, the models are 
overwhelmingly valid. In essence, the null hypotheses of the AR(2) and Sargan OIR tests for the 
absence of autocorrelation and the validity of the instruments respectively are not 
overwhelmingly rejected.  
   
Table 2: The effect of education on corruption and corruption-control  
         
 Corruption  Corruption-Control  
         
         
Corruption (-1) 0.930*** 0.776*** 0.692*** 0.665*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Corruption Control (-1) --- --- --- --- 1.078*** 1.160*** 0.990 0.947*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  -0.167 0.230 0.698 0.484 0.079 0.192 0.063 0.086 
 (0.693) (0.491) (0.248) (0.215) (0.768) (0.528) (0.643) (0.525) 
PSE  0.002 --- --- --- 0.0006 --- --- --- 
 (0.597)    (0.695)    
SSE --- 0.005* --- --- --- -0.0006 --- --- 
  (0.067)    (0.865)   
TSE --- --- 0.011 --- --- --- -0.001 --- 
   (0.103)    (0.461)  
Educatex  --- --- --- 0.158*** --- --- ---  
    (0.002)    0.029 
        (0.450) 
GDP growth  0.031 0.023 0.020 0.067*** -0.0003 -0.0009 0.001 0.001 
 (0.127) (0.116) (0.316) (0.003) (0.945) (0.887) (0.869) (0.911) 
Trade  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.577) (0.138) (0.746) (0.311) (0.167) (0.107) (0.124) (0.259) 
Inflation   -0.0001 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.001** 0.001 0.0009 0.001** 
 (0.988) (0.700) (0.719) (0.799) (0.015) (0.446) (0.186) (0.036) 
         
         
Year 1998 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
         
Year 2001 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
         
Year 2004 −0.178 −0.184 −0.165 −0.178 −0.007 −0.002 0.054 −0.042 
 (0.281) (0.216) (0.512) (0.381) (0.914) (0.977) (0.410) (0.523) 
Year 2007 −0.100 −0.105 −0.106 −0.105 −0.021 0.011 0.038 −0.045 
 (0.573) (0.546) (0.709) (0.657) (0.750) (0.889) (0.564) (0.564) 
Year 2010 −0.077 −0.172 −0.204 −0.193 0.007 0.027 0.067 −0.042 
 (0.734) (0.389) (0.449) (0.449) (0.928) (0.810) (0.333) (0.710) 
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Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) -1.353 -1.081 -1.796 -0.982 -0.147 -0.812 -1.284 -0.270 
 (0.176) (0.279) (0.072) (0.325) (0.882) (0.416) (0.198) (0.786) 
Sargan OIR 10.787 9.571 12.616 8.525 10.855 11.809 10.447 11.609 
 (0.214) (0.296) (0.125) (0.383) (0.210) (0.159) (0.235) (0.169) 
Wald  (joint) 131.51*** 732.15*** 145.54*** 154.87*** 226.47*** 545.01*** 446.12*** 666.98*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Instruments  17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Countries 29 25 22 20 45 42 38 33 
Observations  92 77 69 59 165 141 128 104 
         
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  
Restrictions test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to 
reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values are in 
brackets.  
 
 In light of the investigated concerns, the following findings are established. First, 
education is a powerful tool in the fight against corruption. Second, there is no evidence of an 
incremental positive effect in the transition from secondary to tertiary education. Third, lifelong 
learning negatively affects corruption. Fourth, there is evidence of a synergy effect because the 
impact of lifelong learning is higher than the combined effects of various educational levels
4
. The 
absence of any significant effect of primary school enrolment on corruption is in line with 
intuition because pupils at this level of education are generally too young to engage in economic 
activities warranting corruption. The fact that the four concerns are not verified for corruption-
control is consistent with intuition. In essence, those attending primary, secondary and tertiary 
education are more disposed to corruption than to corruption-control. Essentially, the latter is an 
embodiment of professionals or anti-corruption officials.  
 Given that time-specific effects are not significant, we replicate the specifications in Table 
2 without time-effects. The corresponding results presented in Table 3 are broadly consistent with 
those in Table 2, with two main additions. First, the estimated coefficient of tertiary school 
enrolment is now significant. Hence, there is evidence of an incremental positive effect in the 
transition from secondary to tertiary education. In other words, the likelihood of not engaging in 
corrupt activities decreases as one transits from a secondary school to a university. Second, trade 
is now positively significant for the most part. While we expected economic prosperity to 
positively affect the scourge (as discussed in the data section), differences in results could be 
based on methodological variations. In essence, while Asongu and Jellal (2013) have 
instrumented GDP growth with foreign aid dynamics, the instruments in the GMM approach are 
lagged levels and differences of the regressors for the first difference and level equations 
                                                 
4
 As highlighted in the data section, when interpreting the effect on corruption, it is important to note that the CPI is 
measured such that decreasing values denote higher levels of corruption. 
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respectively. This explanation is broadly in line with Asongu (2012b, p. 191) who has established 
that economic prosperity is a tool in fighting corruption using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  
 
Table 2: The effect of education on corruption and corruption-control (without time effects) 
         
 Corruption  Corruption-Control  
         
         
Corruption (-1) 0.765*** 0.773*** 0.761*** 0.685*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Corruption Control (-1) --- --- --- --- 1.258*** 1.254*** 1.015*** 0.990*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  0.136 0.112 0.290 0.389 0.310 0.298 0.114 0.095 
 (0.775) (0.724) (0.243) (0.184) (0.473) (0.356) (0.395) (0.535) 
PSE  0.002 --- --- --- −0.0001 --- --- --- 
 (0.308)    (0.927)    
SSE --- 0.005** --- --- --- −0.001 --- --- 
  (0.021)    (0.619)   
TSE --- --- 0.012* --- --- --- −0.001 --- 
   (0.098)    (0.500)  
Educatex  --- --- --- 0.144** --- --- --- 0.014 
    (0.015)    (0.689) 
         
GDP growth  0.007 0.020 0.036** 0.069** 0.001 0.0001 0.001 −0.0001 
 (0.765) (0.202) (0.031) (0.012) (0.842) (0.982) (0.810) (0.988) 
Trade  0.003* 0.002* 0.001 0.003 −0.002 −0.001* −0.001 −0.001 
 (0.077) (0.059) (0.689) (0.411) (0.123) (0.071) (0.111) (0.232) 
Inflation   0.006   0.001 -0.001 −0.008 0.001** 0.001 0.001 0.001*** 
 (0.569) (0.572) (0.650) (0.587) (0.022) (0.251) (0.187) (0.007) 
         
         
         
Time effects  No No No No No No No No 
AR(2) -1.354 -1.308 -1.569 -0.806 0.007 -0.795 -0.706 -0.609 
 (0.175) (0.190) (0.116) (0.419) (0.994) (0.426) (0.480) (0.542) 
Sargan OIR 11.653 7.750 12.346 9.021 8.353 10.303 9.972 9.917 
 (0.167) (0.458) (0.136) (0.340) (0.399) (0.244) (0.267) (0.270) 
Wald  (joint) 158.51*** 655.31*** 316.32*** 282.53*** 313.37*** 415.16*** 407.63*** 1282.4*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Instruments  14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Countries 29 25 22 20 45 42 38 33 
Observations  92 77 69 59 165 141 128 104 
         
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  
Restrictions test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to 
reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values are in 
brackets.  
 
 
4. Concluding remarks and future directions  
The negative effect of education on corruption is traceable to the cognitive and non-
cognitive benefits of the former. Such benefits, inter alia have been documented in the first 
paragraph of the introduction (Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2009; Heyneman, 2002). According to 
the narrative, education induces patience and the ability to sacrifice the present for better gains in 
the future, essentially because students have to work hard to obtain pass grades (Kaffenberger, 
12 
 
2012). While the results are not consistent with the strand of the literature suggesting that 
education increases participation in corrupt activities (Kaffenberger, 2012; Mocan, 2008; Truex, 
2011), this stream of the literature nonetheless indirectly recognizes the role of education in 
fighting corruption if proper policies are put in place (Truex, 2011).  The Incremental effect 
evidence is consistent with Lederman et al. (2005) and Cheung and Chan (2008) who have 
concluded that lower levels of corruption are linked to higher levels in education. But most 
importantly, the effect of synergy and the incremental impact have two interesting policy 
implications. First, encouraging education through the tertiary level enhances the fight against 
corruption. Second, there is a ‘corruption mitigating’ benefit in the drive towards knowledge 
economy by means of lifelong learning.  
 It is important to note that the measurement of lifelong learning used in this study does 
not capture moral and ethical conscientious learning which are very likely to be associated with 
corruption. Moreover, lifelong learning does not stop with schooling. The first few years of work 
provide an individual with practical realities of life which are equally educative. Hence, the 
working environment also has some influence in the perception of corruption. Accordingly, while 
countries with large government sectors could be associated with higher degrees of corruption, 
those characterized with a substantial private sector and competitive market economy may be 
associated with less corruption. Future research could account for these factors in order to 
advance scholarship on the established linkages. Along the same direction of thought, it would be 
interesting for future lines of inquiry to consider other schooling indicators like dropout rates, 
standardized tests and repetition rates.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Definitions of variables 
   
Variable(s) Definition(s) Source(s) 
   
Corruption  “Corruption Perception Index represents an aggregation 
of perceived levels of corruption as determined by expert 
assessments and opinion surveys”.  
World Bank (WDI)  
   
Corruption-Control “Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions 
of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and 
private interests”.  
World Bank (WDI)  
   
Primary Schooling (PS) Primary School Enrolment (% of Gross) World Bank (WDI)  
   
Secondary Schooling (SS) Secondary School Enrolment (% of Gross) World Bank (WDI)  
   
Tertiary Schooling (TS)  Tertiary  School Enrolment (% of Gross) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Educational index  First principal component of PS, SS & TS PCA 
   
GDP growth  Gross Domestic Product growth rate (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Trade Openness  Exports plus Imports of Commodities (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Inflation  Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
   
   
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. PCA: Principal Component Analysis.  
 
Appendix 2: Summary statistics  
      
 Mean S.D Min Max Obs. 
      
Corruption 3.005 1.064 1.066 6.100 181 
Corruption Control -0.598 0.622 -2.344 0.971 265 
Primary School Enrolment 94.414 25.647 28.298 149.70 237 
Secondary School Enrolment  38.683 26.489 5.372 115.03 199 
Tertiary School Enrolment  6.228 8.489 0.241 53.867 183 
Educational index  -0.070 1.327 -2.103 5.527 152 
GDP growth   4.755 5.587 -11.272 49.367 254 
Trade Openness  78.340 39.979 20.980 250.95 247 
Inflation  56.191 575.70 -45.335 8603.3 230 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations.  
 
Appendix 3: Correlation Analysis  
          
PSE SSE TSE  Educatex  GDPg Trade  Inflation  Corruption C. Control  
1.000 0.452 0.257 0.635 0.095 0.261 -0.064 0.239 0.190 PSE 
 1.000 0.725 0.919 -0.078 0.389 -0.100 -0.641 0.548 SSE 
  1.000 0.843 -0.036 0.057 -0.081 0.289 0.176 TSE 
   1.000 -0.006 0.283 -0.106 0.485 0.374 Educatex 
    1.000 0.179 -0.132 -0.056 -0.115 GDPg 
     1.000 0.024 0.209 0.194 Trade  
      1.000 -0.054 -0.121 Inflation  
       1.000 0.896 Corruption 
        1.000 C. Control 
          
PSE: Primary School Enrolment. SSE: Secondary School Enrolment. TSE: Tertiary School Enrolment. Educatex: 
Educational index. GDPg: GDP growth rate. C. Control: Corruption Control.  
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